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Abstract:  
 
Ever since Citizenship was introduced at EU level, the concept’s perception has varied 
from a mere declaratory status to a more substantial, fundamental status attached to 
Europeans. Regardless of whether one views Citizenship as the latter or the former of 
the above construes, this concept is undoubtedly intriguing and is still the subject of 
discussions and studies. This paper wishes to contribute to the debate regarding the 
concept of Union Citizenship and its future and relevance in today’s EU. The scope of 
the notion has been enriched considerably since its conception, as a result of the work of 
the Court of Justice although the Treaty provisions have not reflected this and they 
remain largely unchanged since 1993. Owing to said case-law, different constructions 
of Citizenship have been proposed in the academic literature; this paper focuses on the 
nature of the relationship between Union Citizenship and the pursuit of an economic 
activity and the relative independence the former enjoys owing to the recent CJEU 
case-law. This independence will be assessed in three parts, covering this content of 
Citizenship which supports the latter’s independence, its arguably receding association 
with the common market and its aims, and the support which the Lisbon Treaty’s new 
stance on social values could potentially offer.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The concept of Union citizenship, which was introduced with considerable 
political turmoil by the Maastricht Treaty, is older than its founding treaty 
suggests; rather, an incipient1 form of European citizenship has existed ever 
since the (then) Community was founded.2 Of course, the economic rights that 
are now associated with Citizenship were at that time attached to workers only 
and it took the European Union (henceforth “EU” or “the Union”) many 
decades to realise that a political union was also needed to complement its 
already existing economic counterpart. With the progress of the Union and the 
efforts of the Court of Justice of the EU (henceforth “the Court”), the free 
movement provisions became more substantive and these efforts were 
amalgamated in the introduction of a more inclusive, but far from perfect, 
Union Citizenship.  
 
However, not all rights are unchallenged; thus, workers’ rights, no matter how 
fundamental, are still subject to judicial review, which has to incorporate not 
only the wording, but also the aim of the legislation, along with the 
constitutional reality which stipulates the balance between social and economic 
values by which each era of EU integration should abide. The results of this 
review are most evident in the four cases associated with the Posted Workers’ 
Directive, although the most recent case-law has demonstrated a subtle yet 
important departure from the principles it created. Owing to this change of 
course, the previous Court’s efforts, and the new constitutional status quo, the 
rights of free movement, residence, and establishment have created a 
substantive nucleus of rights, which, combined with the Union citizenship, 
offer a significant advantage to European citizens. 
 
This paper aims to compare the following two notions: the notion of the Union 
citizen who has the right to move and reside within the territory of the Union 
and enjoys a variety of rights which are detached from the need to fulfil an 
                                            
1 The term was used as early as 1968 by the then Vice-President of the European Commission, 
who stated that free movement was ‘more important and more exacting than the free movement 
of a factor of production’. His speech was published in the EC-Bulletin of November 1968.  
2 See, indicatively, an article published in the mid-1970’s which already referred to citizens, a 
concept that, at the time, was 20 years away: A Lhoest ‘Le Citoyen à la une de l’Europe’ [1975] 
RMC 431. Even earlier than that, in 1951, the first President of the European Commission, W. 
Hallstein, said that free movement in the ESCS was reminiscent of a European citizenship.  
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economic activity (citoyen), and the notion of citizen/worker who decides to 
pursue an economic activity in another Member State (travailleur). The notion 
of citizenship was introduced in order to ‘be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States’3 and ‘a positive contribution to the legitimacy 
of the European Union which an active and participatory concept of social 
citizenship may make’4 and for these reasons it encompassed various rights but 
fewer, if any, obligations; the notion of worker, on the other hand, is older and 
comprises a wider variety of rights. In recent years, however, the Court has 
acknowledged the independent nature of citizenship rights.  
 
This paper shall examine the manner in which citizenship rights operate in the 
current legal and constitutional configuration of the Union with the ultimate 
goal of providing an appropriate answer to the question regarding the true 
extent of citizenship’s independence from the pursuit of economic activity. In 
order to do so, the paper will first explore the independent nature of the Union 
citizenship by referring to the political rights attached to it while attempting an 
assessment of their value, extent, and shortcomings. Part II shall assess the 
citizenship’s connection to the internal market through the more recent case-
law which suggests a departure from the market-based construction of 
citizenship and, in some cases, even from a long-established rule according to 
which EU rights are triggered by intra-border move. Initially, the second part 
shall focus on the case-law which revisits the rules on purely internal situations, 
while the rest of the second part will examine recent ground-breaking cases 
such as Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy which seem to be establishing new 
guidelines on how to address issues of citizenship where the traditional rules of 
intra-border move may not apply as unambiguously as in the past, owing to 
potentially complicated lives of Europe’s residents. Lastly, part III will focus on 
the potential contribution of the Lisbon Treaty to the constitutional re-shaping 
of the Citizenship provisions. Effectively, the two parts which follow will 
present two strands of Citizenship, as identified in the title, and the third part 
shall suggest a way of bridging the gap between them.  
2. Rights without a market 
 
                                            
3 C-184/99 Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale [2001] ECR I-6193. 
4 Jo Shaw, ‘Citizenship in the Union: Towards Post-National Membership’ in Collected Courses of 
the European Academy VI-I (Kluwer 1998). 
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One of the most intriguing aspects of the Union Citizenship is the inclusion of 
political rights,5 namely the passive and active electoral rights that EU citizens 
enjoy.6 The importance of these rights lies in their unique character in 
international law. Although in bilateral agreements signed by their respective 
parties a degree of reciprocity is not uncommon, the granting of political rights 
to nationals of another state, and voting rights no less, is not so common, and, 
thus, it should not be underestimated. However, the truth is that the 
participation in elections and exercise of the rights inherent in EU Citizenship 
have been low; moreover, the number of people exercising ‘alien suffrage’ has 
been lower than the number of people voting in their own countries.7 
 
                                            
5 It is noteworthy that there is no reference to duties in the treaties. Although the status civitatis 
is normally associated with both rights and duties, the EU legislation governing citizenship 
mirrors the sui generis status of the Human Rights law that bypasses the states and gives rights 
to the individual without following the traditional state/citizen relationship, which is, by nature, 
reciprocal. The same principle was used for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, which is silent on duties. It is hard to imagine EU citizens having the same 
duties as in their states of origin; moreover, given the current integration in the EU, it is 
reasonable that the Union cannot impose any duties upon its citizens as it lacks the main 
characteristics of a state under international law. It could be argued, however, that all EU 
citizens have the duty to respect the laws and cultures of the states in which they reside when 
they exercise their right to free movement, but complying with the law is a general duty and not 
one that can be codified by the institutions of the EU. 
6 For a detailed study of the political rights see Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship in the 
European Union (CUP 2007). The reader is reminded that the electoral rights are as follows: EU 
citizens have the right to stand and vote in municipal and European elections in a Member 
State other than their own. See Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down 
detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections 
to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they 
are not nationals OJ L 329; also, the Resolution of the implementation of the Directive OJ 
C44/159. See also Council Directive 96/30/EC of 13 May 1996 amending Directive 94/80/EC 
laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which 
they are not nationals OJ L 92. See also Directive 2002/722 on the Act concerning the election 
of the members of the EP. The right was problematic in that it was introduced as it was against 
certain constitutional provisions at national level OJ L 220/18; therefore, derogations were 
permissible, as per Commission’s Reports COM(2003)31 and COM(2005)382. EU citizens have 
also the right to protection by diplomatic authorities of any EU Member State in countries 
where their state of origin is not represented. This right provides for the equal treatment of 
non-nationals and it operates on a reciprocal basis and does not require any actions on behalf 
of the Union in the field of its international relations. Additionally, EU citizens have the right to 
appeal to the EP and the Ombudsman. The latter applies also to non-EU citizens, residents of 
EU Member States. The former was part of the EP’s Rules of Procedure since 1981 but after 
1993 the right to appeal was established by primary legislation.  
7 See COM/2002/260.  
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It seems, therefore, that the political rights have not had a considerable impact 
and this is reflected in the relevant case-law, which remains limited. In Spain v 
UK,8 the Court allowed the UK to extend voting rights to Commonwealth 
citizens residing in Gibraltar,9 although they were not EU citizens. It was 
argued that the right to rule on who is a beneficiary of such rights should be 
retained by the Member States. Despite Spain’s objection, the UK was not in 
breach of any rules when it decided to give electoral rights to individuals with 
close links to its territory. In a similar case, Eman,10 the Netherlands excluded 
some of its nationals residing in Dutch overseas territories (henceforth 
“OST’s”). Although the Court argued that nationals of a Member State residing 
in an overseas territory could still rely upon Union Citizenship rights, as far as 
voting rights were concerned, the situation was somewhat different. As per an 
earlier case of the European Court of Human Rights, residence criteria 
determining the entitlement to voting were acceptable.11 However, the Court 
found that the Dutch were in breach of the equal treatment principle because 
Dutch nationals residing in non-Member States were given the right to vote, 
although their OST’s counterparts were not. In other procedural details, in 
Pignataro12 the Court held that national requirements which stipulated that a 
candidate for regional elections be a resident of the region in question were not 
a breach of European Union legislation. 
 
Despite the limited participation and case-law, political rights are more 
important that the attention paid to them suggests.13 It has been customary for 
states to provide their citizens with the right to participate in the electoral 
                                            
8 C-145/04 Spain v UK [2006] ECR I-07917. 
9 Gibraltar is not officially part of the UK but remains a colony of the British Crown.  
10 C-300/04 Eman v College van burgeneester en wethounders van Den Haag [2006] ECR I-08055. 
11 Melnychenko v Ukraine, no. 17707/02 ECHR 2004-X. 
12 C-535/08 Pignataro v Ufficio centrale circoscrizionale presso il Tribunale di Catania and Others 
[2009] ECR I-00050. 
13 The elevated status of an EU citizen has give rise to a number of cases covering niche areas 
such as the right to respect the correct spelling of one’s name or the recognition of the name. 
In C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann [2010] ECR I-00000 the Court found that EU 
legislation could not allow for national laws that did not recognise an adopted person’s name 
which contained a title of nobility, because such titles were inadmissible according to Austria’s 
constitutional law. See also C-391/09 Runevič and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus [2011] ECR I-
00000 where the Court also prohibited national laws to use only the country’s language or only 
Roman letters when they write a person’s name for administrative purposes without marks, 
ligatures or other diacritical signs that are used in other languages. 
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process (either as voters or as candidates).14 Apart from the democratic 
importance of voting, there is another argument closer to the topic of this 
paper: freedom of movement. The Court15 has scrutinised national legislation 
which constitutes discrimination of any kind and EU law, either primary or 
secondary, and it has made it clear that discrimination shall not be upheld. It 
follows that not having the right to vote in the state to which one wishes to 
move is a discriminatory rule that could hinder free movement, not to mention 
the better social integration that voting helps to create and the added substance 
voting rights represent. Further to the aforementioned democratic importance, 
it is significant, symbolically and practically, for the European Parliament 
(henceforth “EP”) to have a membership decided by the European electorate as 
it would give it the character of a European institution, detached from national 
interests,16 while at the same time bridging the democratic deficit and perceived 
elitism from which the EU has been suffering. 
 
The political rights associated with Citizenship are not devoid of thorny issues, 
however; two immediately identifiable problems concern, on the one hand, the 
limited number of rights, and on the other hand the lack of more substantive 
rights.17 Regardless of the fact that these rights are of a non-derivative nature as 
they are independent of the pursuit of economic activity, the truth is that the 
rights to petition to the EP and to submit applications to the Ombudsman are 
applicable to any legal or natural person residing in any EU Member State, 
making the rights to vote and the consular protection the only rights that are 
                                            
14 In certain cases, individual Member States granted the right to vote to non-nationals before 
the introduction of citizenship, albeit in exceptional circumstances. Moreover, the right to vote 
and stand in local elections was also given to states with a certain degree of cultural 
homogeneity, like Ireland and the UK. Another noteworthy provision was a 1992 Council of 
Europe Convention which gave the right to vote to non-nationals who had a significant 
cultural, historic or linguistic link to the territory in which they lived. This Convention was 
ratified by a small number of States and cannot, practically, be considered an influential step 
but its symbolic importance is vastly more considerable.  
15 The Court’s case-law played an instrumental role in the introduction of the Citizens’ 
Directive which has been heavily influenced by previous rulings such as this in Baumbast. Apart 
from said ruling, the ruling of Van Duyn regarding the assessment of personal conduct was also 
incorporated in the Directive (see Article 27(2)). 
16 Asteris Pliakos, ‘La nature juridique de l‘Union européenne’ [1993] RTDE 187. The same 
effect has the fact that the seating plan is drawn according to political affiliations, not 
nationalities. Moreover, according to the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, (see Article 12(2)), the EP expresses the political will of the EU citizens. 
17 Such gaps have made scholars call citizenship merely ‘symbolic’. See Catherine Jacqueson, 
‘Union Citizenship and the Court of Justice: Something New under the Sun? Towards Social 
Citizenship’ (2002) 27 ELRev 260. 
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appropriately ‘European’. An interesting addition is the Citizens’ Initiative 
which was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon,18 although it is too early to judge 
its effectiveness partly because more time is needed and partly because it is very 
much dependent on the will and organised actions of EU Citizens, residents of 
different Member States, and probably with different interests frequently 
shaped by national policies and mentalities. The Initiative is indeed very 
representative of most EU rights that remain unappreciated until the need 
arises and they are then invoked.19  
 
The second problem identified above concerns the limited substance that some 
of the political rights carry. For instance, the right to vote applies only to 
municipal elections. It is indeed curious that the EU has failed even to 
endeavour to grant full voting rights to EU Citizens residing in a state other 
than that of which they are nationals, especially as it would seem as a conditia 
sine qua non for being a citizen of the democratic union which the EU treaties 
describe, an argument supported by the Advocate General (henceforth AG) in 
the Spain v UK case discussed previously. The Court, however, has not 
endorsed this view yet, which is, arguably, the most striking omission,20 given 
the need to further differentiate political citizenship from the purely market-
oriented rights21 and the lack of any argument to support the discrepancy 
between voting rights at municipal and national levels.22 This presents two 
problems for EU Citizens who reside in a state where they cannot vote: by 
moving to another state, a European citizen forfeits the right to vote in his or 
her country of origin in the same manner he or she forfeits the right to live 
there. Therefore, EU Citizens are left without the power to participate in the 
political life of the state in which they reside and, as a consequence of their 
decision to pursue their rights under the Treaties, they have arguably no reason 
to vote in their state of origin given that they do not live there. It could be 
argued that a number of these Citizens would still want to participate in home 
                                            
18 See Article 11(4) TFEU which reads the following: ‘not less than one million citizens who are 
nationals of a significant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European 
Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where 
citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’. 
19 N Nic Shuibhne, ‘The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship’ (2010) 47 CMLR 1597. 
20 The Commission has, however, identified the need for a more evidently democratic Union. In 
1975, in a report, it was stated that ‘complete assimilation with nationals as regards political 
rights is desirable in the long term from the point of view of a European Union’. See European 
Commission, Towards European Citizenship: The Granting of Special Rights, COM(75)321. 
21 The arrangement between the UK and Ireland is an exception which is, however, unrelated 
to the Union and it concerns Britain’s history.  
22 Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’ (2007) 13 ELJ 623.  
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country elections for personal reasons, but this is missing the point of the gap 
in the EU political rights.23  
 
The other problem that arises is reflective of the sometimes à la carte nature of 
the Union; although there is a great variety of rights, which cover working 
conditions, travel, social benefits, and education, EU Citizens are still unable to 
make an active contribution to the host states. This argument might seem very 
similar (if not identical) to the previous one, but there is a distinct difference: 
while the former argument looks at the issue from the perspective of the rights 
of the individual, the latter takes the host state into consideration in that in 
acknowledges that there are also benefits for the host states and it is not a 
matter of merely offering incentives to those who consider exercising their free 
movement rights. Despite the positive aspects of granting full voting rights and 
the sheer contradiction between the case-law, the intentions of the 
Commission, and the spirit of the law, Member States are not considering 
changing this situation, as the Lisbon Treaty showcases.  
 
The reasons for this can most likely be found in the customary fear of loss of 
sovereignty and, to a lesser extent, in the practical difficulties inherent in such a 
reciprocal agreement. As far as the former argument is concerned, it is possible 
that the constitutions of (some) Member States prevent them from awarding 
voting rights to non-nationals, rendering, therefore, the fruition of the 
endeavour in question problematic but by no means impossible. With regards 
to the latter argument, although the constitutional reality might be difficult to 
circumvent, the same could (and was) probably said for the reciprocity we now 
encounter in the field of social benefits and education. The Court has fought 
hard, and for a considerable amount of time to stop Member States posing 
either administrative or legal barriers to free movement, and these efforts have 
proven successful. The same could be applied to the case of the political rights 
and this would need a change of approach from the current reality of 
functionalism24 to a more sentimental approach: Although we are all parts of 
                                            
23 Understandably, this is a wider point and it can lead to a whole different discussion. Why one 
would choose to vote and especially participate in the electoral procedure of a country of which 
one is not a resident is a complex topic. Moreover, in an ever closer Union, decisions in one 
country might affect residents and nationals of another Member State making the possibility of 
double voting a topic in its own right. However, for the purposes of this paper, the lack of 
comprehensive voting rights in the country of residence is the important omission. 
24 This is not to say that functionalism and pragmatism are to be dismissed. Indeed, they have 
their own role to play especially when the Union tries to promote its policies to national 
governments. As the 2010 crisis showed, countries are reluctant  to offer their funds to 
bankrupt (or failing) economies but it will be easier to present the case for health care and/or 
effective protection abroad for all EU Citizens, regardless of what this might mean in terms of 
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the internal market, to such a degree that we rarely realise we operate within it, 
we continue to forget what the Union means to us Europeans and this is also a 
failure of the institutions to maintain the history of Europe as a continent in the 
foreground, given the very existence of the Union is based on its continent’s 
turbulent history.  
 
A different lesson that we can learn from the progress in the area of social 
benefits is that reciprocity is not enough, and this should also apply to the 
discussion about further, more comprehensive political rights for EU Citizens. 
Any reciprocal agreement should be coupled with a (reasonable and 
proportionate) number of duties.25 Currently, Europeans do not have duties at 
EU level, apart from general legal principles such as the duty to respect the law 
of the host state, a principle that is a general attribute of the Law and not a 
distinct feature of the EU legal order. This lack of duties has not changed even 
after the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty; normally, this would not be an 
obstacle as the Court has proven it can interpret the treaties broadly. However, 
when it comes to duties, the Court will probably consider them to be obstacles 
to free movement rather than a healthy component of any democracy-based 
legal and constitutional order26 and will rarely uphold them. This is particularly 
worrying in the case of abuse of rights27 by EU Citizens28 and it seems that the 
                                                                                                                                  
costs and sovereignty at national level. Admittedly, such an endeavour seems particularly 
challenging in times of severe economic turmoil when solidarity is a scarce commodity.   
25 Possible duties that have been mentioned include taxation and military service, although the 
latter might be deemed inappropriate given the nature of the EU, while the former indirectly 
exists as each Member State pays due contributions to the EU and these are financed (at least 
partly) by national taxes. See indicatively, AJ Menendez, ‘Taxing Europe: Two Cases for a 
European Power to Tax’ (2004) 10 Colum.J.Eur.L 297; Norbert Reich, ‘Union Citizenship- 
Metaphor or Source of Rights?’ (2001) 7 ELJ 4.  
26 For a more general discussion on the role of duties in citizenship see R Rubio Marin, 
Immigration as a Democratic Challenge: Citizenship and Inclusion in Germany and the United States 
(CUP 2000). 
27 See for instance case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 
ECR I-992. The case did no concern an EU Citizen (but it is nevertheless representative of the 
argument made above) but a third country national who had been expelled from the UK and 
subsequently moved to Ireland where she gave birth to a child who bore the Irish citizenship 
owing to the ius soli principle. The UK government argued that Ms Chen used the EU 
legislation in order to return to the UK but the Court did not accept it although it might as well 
have been the case. Ireland has ever since modified its law to allow for ius soli to operate but 
only if the parent(s) has been a resident (either permanent or not) of the country for a period of 
time. 
28 Even if a Member State genuinely believes that another Member State citizen residing in its 
territory is abusing his or her EU rights for personal gain, the Court will rarely accept it without 
objective evidential material and will have to embark on an investigation on an ad hoc basis.  
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most prudent solution would be a formal inclusion of duties in a Treaty as the 
Court would not be wise, or in constitutional terms properly endowed, to 
replace the legislator and create duties for Citizens.  
 
Contrary to what the notion of citizen means at a national level, at the EU level 
it was not created to be either independent or reminiscent of the legal status of 
national citizens. It was created as the amalgamation of an enormous free 
movement case-law backlogue and for years it was coupled with the 
fundamental freedoms of the common market, non-discrimination,29 the right 
to residence and the principle of equal treatment.  However, it has been 
suggested that owing to the work of the Court, these concepts have gradually 
lost their blind attachment to market values and, consequently, Citizenship has 
moved towards the status of a fifth fundamental freedom.30 This progress 
notwithstanding, the political rights have not been entirely successful (or 
inclusive) and the following section shall explore this change in approach and 
how it is reflected in the most recent case-law. 
3. Citizenship and free movement case-law: Brave new approach 
3.1 Early constructions of Citizenship 
 
                                            
29 Under the Lisbon Treaty, discrimination is covered by Article 18 TFEU but is not included in 
the citizenship provisions (although both provisions are under the same title), arguably because 
non-discrimination has become a basic principle of EU Law and underpins every piece of 
legislation. It has been argued that the Court has not coherently interpreted EU law by allowing 
non-discrimination principle to be used even by non-economic actors. However, such an 
interpretation would be contrary to the objectives of the Union and its internal market. For an 
example of this criticism see D Martin, ‘A Big Step for Union Citizens, but a Step Backwards 
for Legal Coherence’ (2002) 4 EJML 136-144. It is noteworthy that even discrimination is not 
utterly limitless. In C-138/02 Collins v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] ECR I-2703, 
the Court effectively stated that derogations from the principle might be upheld if evidence 
arises that suggests that the provision in question has a legitimate aim and the nationality of the 
litigants is immaterial, but there are other, impartial evidence to be taken into account. This is 
particularly the case with regards to social benefits, a restricted access to which has been 
accepted by the Court when it concerns the initial enter to the host state. For instance, the 
Citizens’ Directive excludes social benefits from the benefits EU Citizen may enjoy during the 
initial 3-month period stipulated by the Directive. In this respect, Member States enjoy a wide 
discretion.  
30 See Editorial Comments, ‘Two-Speed European Citizenship? Can the Lisbon Treaty help 
close the gap?’ (2008) 45 CMLR 1; Ferdinand Wollenschläger, ‘A New Fundamental Freedom 
beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic 
Paradigm of European Integration’ (2011) 17 ELJ 1.  
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The first concept to which Citizenship was tied was that of the nationalities of 
the Member States which were not to be replaced by citizenship but merely 
complemented. Therefore, only the bearers of one of the 2731 nationalities of 
the EU can benefit from the rights associated with EU Citizenship. The trouble 
in this is that nationalities, and, thus, national citizenships, are governed by 
national civil codes, and, thus, decisions to grant or, more importantly for this 
argument, remove one’s nationality rests with the Member States. Although 
this is not unreasonable or uncommon in and of itself, the problem will arise 
when someone is deprived of his or her national citizenship, they will have no 
opportunity to use their European rights,32 and, given the authority Member 
States still have on issues of civil law, invocation of the principle of 
proportionality may not be an option for the Court, especially if the case 
concerns a wholly internal situation. It would take a very radical and bold Court 
to challenge this particular division of powers.  
                                            
31 The case of the 12 new Member States is interesting as, prior to their accession they had to 
rely upon European Agreements. The case-law that concerns the new states is still limited and 
it mostly concerns cases that arose while the new states were under the preparatory regime 
which would allow them to adopt the acquis communautaire. See C-162/00 Land Nordhein-
Westphalen v Beata Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer [2002] ECR I-1049; C-348/00 Deutscher Handballbund v 
Maros Kolpak [2003] ECR I-4135; C-257/99 R v Secreatry of State for the Home Department ex parte 
Julius Barkoci and Marcel Malik [2001] ECR I-6557. These cases dealt with the direct effect of the 
non-discrimination provisions for the nationals of the Member States which were preparing 
their accession. Although these Agreements did not provide the right to free movement, they 
did provide better cover to nationals of the 12 who were already residing in the EU. Equally 
important is C-327/02 L.G. Panayotova et al v Minister voor Vreemdelingzaken en Integratie [2004] 
ECR I-11055, which established the right to establishment, albeit in a preliminary version 
which covered only those who, upon entering an EU Member State could be self-sufficient. 
After the EA’s, the treaties that provided for the free movement rights in the new Member 
States were the Accession Treaties, which gave free movement rights to 10 of the new Member 
States after a transitional period of 7 years (Malta and Cyprus were excluded). This transitional 
period was established with the insistence of Germany and Austria, but it is still morally 
questionable that such long periods had to apply. These restrictions expired in May 2011 and, 
consequently, we have yet to grasp the effect this will have on the labour markets of the ‘old’ 
Member States but judging from the relatively low number of Europeans who exercise their 
right to move in order to work in another Member States, these effects should not be grave. It 
is, however, noteworthy, that the transitional rules for students allowed them to work, for a 
limited period during their studies in a Member State other than their own, as long as they 
were not workers under Article 39 EC (now 45 TFEU) in which case the host state retained the 
right to apply national measures. Despite these restrictions, which were inserted for political 
reasons, it seems that providing citizenship rights (even in a more limited incarnation) was a 
very plausible way to insert a certain feeling of ‘Europeanness’ to the new States.   
32 The situation between the two distinct types of citizenship is more complicated than that as 
the citizenship of the Union still affects how Member States grant or remove their citizenships 
(see C-369/90 Micheletti v Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4239; C-135/08 
Rottman v Freistaat Bayern [2009] ECR 0000; and Chen and Zhu (n 27), but, nevertheless, national 
citizenships have priority.  
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It could be argued that national citizenships are not as important when 
exercising EU rights. Ever since the first transitional period to implement the 
EEC Treaty ended, job-seekers have enjoyed rights related to social benefits, 
access to employment, residency and education, owing to the adoption of 
secondary legislation. Additionally, the Court expanded the scope of non-
discrimination in order to ensure that ‘Community law […] is based on the 
freedom of movement of persons, and, apart from certain exceptions, on the 
general application of the principle of equal treatment with nationals’.33 The 
degree of solidarity afforded by the Court to job-seekers and workers34 in terms 
of access to employment and benefits but also residence without the need to 
pursue an economic activity has been surprisingly high for a supranational 
organisation such as the EU, but despite all these Union citizenship is still 
attached to its national counterparts and the latter have traditionally been 
outside the scope of equal treatment.35 Claiming, however, that national 
citizenships are obsolete would be premature partly because there is a lack of a 
constitutional basis to such a claim given the wording of Article 20 TFEU 
regarding the relationship between national and European citizenships; and 
partly because Member States still have the right to protect their heritage and 
national idiosyncrasies and these would include citizenship. 
 
Citizenship, however, is also attached to the right of residence. When the 
Community realised that a political union was also necessary if the European 
project was to be fruitful, it covered residence issues with three Residence 
Directives which included non-economic actors in their personal scopes. Of 
course, these provisions were not without reservations, whether these came in 
the shape of public policy derogations or in that of economic conditions related 
to income and insurance, but they were inserted in the treaty texts to avoid 
potential welfare tourism; the Court has been sufficiently protecting free 
movement rights from abuse and disproportionate measures to restrict them. 
                                            
33 8/77 Sagulo [1977] ECR I-1495. 
34 At a later stage of European integration this list included also students, persons of 
independent incomes, and tourists. These inclusions have loosened the connection between 
the market and the free movement provisions.   
35 See C-85/96 Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691; C-274/96 Criminal Proceedings 
against Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637; see RW Davis, ‘Citizenship of the Union... Rights 
for All?’ (2002) 27 ELRev 121; RCA White, ‘Free Movement, Equal Treatment, and Citizenship 
of the Union’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 885. Access to employment in the public services remains one of 
the most indicative examples of this discrepancy (see Articles 45(4), 51; and 62 TFEU. A less 
striking example is the reluctance of the Court to recognise war benefits to EU Citizens who are 
claiming them from countries for which they did not fight during the War, although given the 
degree of solidarity and union in modern-day Europe this is peculiar. 
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More importantly, the Lisbon Treaty has changed the constitutional basis of the 
right as it is now granted by a Treaty Article (see Article 21 TFEU) and not by 
secondary legislation. This elevation, combined with the 2004 Citizens’ 
Directive,36 presents a good opportunity for further association of Citizenship 
with residence; it would be much more substantive to couple these two 
concepts together than maintain the current configuration as the residence and 
Citizenship are both EU concepts and the former ‘would strengthen the feeling 
of union citizenship and is a key element of promoting social cohesion, which is 
one of the fundamental objectives of the Union’.37 
 
As a conclusion, no matter how strictly the Court interprets the provisions on 
expulsion owing to matters of public policy or how liberal the residence 
requirements and mutual recognition of qualifications are, national citizenships 
can be revoked and so can EU rights as a consequence of this. A decoupling of 
the two notions would greatly ameliorate citizenship both substantially and 
conceptually as it would give it a more European aspect and would add 
protection from national actions against EU citizens while it would also achieve 
a better balance between the need to allow for more regulatory independence 
at a national level and a more meaningful concept at the European level. Such 
an arrangement would also resolve the problem that arises when job-seekers 
apply for benefits;38 although citizens who are employed (travailleurs) have equal 
access to social benefits, unemployed Citizens (citoyens) may not be covered so 
comprehensively because they are not economic actors. This distinction 
provides an additional argument to those who claim that being a worker is 
currently better than being a citizen. A further argument could be added to this 
and which is the material scope of non-discrimination which is not without 
boundaries, especially in term of areas that are under the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the host state, such as public posts where non-discrimination cannot fully 
                                            
36 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 
90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC OJ L 158. 
37 Citizens’ Directive Recital 17. 
38 It has been suggested that citizenship at EU level is an ever-expanding field, both owing to 
how it has been constitutionally construed and to practical reasons related to its nature, and, 
thus, it should remain bound to its national counterpart as the latter tends to become weaker as 
European integration proceeds. Although this argument does seem reasonable in the light of 
the interdependent powers in EU’s constitutional reality, a bold movement towards an 
independent concept with Community rather than nationally-derived meaning would provide 
EU movement rights with a momentum they currently lack. 
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operate.39 It is then a matter of choosing the form which the new citizenship 
should take after the addressing of the two elements of deficit cited above.  
3.2 The new approach to citizenship 
 
The aim of this section is not to provide potential solutions to what the new 
citizenship concept will be but to present the basis of such a discussion by 
examining recent case-law, which seems to be improving the citizenship 
dynamics, and the new approach of the Court in the cases of wholly internal 
situations. The latter might indicate an effort to create a nucleus of citizenship 
rights entirely independent from economic activities or even from intra-border 
movement. This set of cases will be examined alongside another trend, that of 
basing the notional reasoning on citizenship (via its sister right to residence) 
while maintaining the free movement provisions as a (arguably more influential) 
legal basis. Therefore, almost two decades after its introduction, mixed 
messages are sent with regard to the status of citizenship: although it has 
progressed sufficiently enough to be mentioned in the case-law as the sole 
reason behind the granting of more rights, it still needs the support of the free 
movement provisions. 
3.2.1 The abandonment of the wholly internal rule 
 
One of the categories under which the free movement case-law can fall 
concerns the cases of litigants who initiate actions based on EU legislation, but 
their contextual details have few, if any, actual links to intra-border movement. 
In these cases the Court would refrain from passing a judgment as it would 
consider that they lack satisfactory connection to EU law or that the mainly 
economic subtext of the Treaty and secondary legislation was not related to the 
situations discussed. 
 
One early example of this was case Ritter-Coulais,40 where the defendants were 
working in the Member State of which they were nationals (Germany) but had 
moved their permanent residence to another Member State. Mr and Mrs Ritter-
                                            
39 F. Wollenschläger makes a related point: he cites the possibility to expel an EU Citizen from 
a Member State which is still permissible under the Treaty but it seems as an extreme example 
mostly because practically it would be hard to implement mostly owing to the Court’s approach 
to proportionality. However, it is indeed peculiar that the right to expel a Citizen is still present 
in primary law provisions even if its implementation is harder than the wording suggests. See 
Wollenschläger (n 30). 
40 C-152/03 Ritter-Coulais v Finanzamt Gemerscheim [2006] ECR I-1711. 
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Coulais requested that the loss of income they suffered as a result of owning a 
house be considered for the calculation of the tax they should be paying under 
German law. The German authorities did not accept this as there was no 
positive income gained from immovable property in another Member State. 
The Court held that this case had sufficient ties with the Union law as the 
defendants were exercising their free movement rights, regardless of the non-
economic nature of his movement. This might not appear strange at first given 
that there is a degree of intra-border movement and the example of frontier 
workers has been found to fall within the Court’s competence41 but the 
defining element is the fact that the economic activity, on which the internal 
market is based, was performed in the Member State of origin. Traditionally, in 
order to invoke EU legislation the movement of a production factor is needed42 
but in this case the Court was happy to effectively dismiss its previous rulings 
according to which the intra-border movement took place with a view to 
pursuing an economic activity.43 The Court addressed the relevance of the case 
to the Union legislation and it appeared to suggest that any movement in order 
to take up employment falls within the scope of EU legislation, a reasoning that 
has attracted attention as legally incoherent owing to the discrepancy between 
the wording of the judgment and the conclusion which was reached.44 A more 
important problem is the fact that the details of the case relate to 1987, prior to 
the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty and the inclusion of Article 18 EC 
regarding free movement. Therefore, the Court was expected to follow the 
Werner45 precedent but did not. 
                                            
41 There was no reason to suggest that this case concerned a frontier worker as in such cases the 
country where the task is performed tends to differ from the country of origin, not the country 
of residence. However, it had been found that such daily commutes could not be left outside 
the jurisdiction of the Court for any good reason, not because of the need to protect the 
commute itself, but, rather, owing to the Court’s determination to remove any obstacles which 
might deter people from exercising their right to move.  
42 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (2nd edn, CUP 2007). 
43 See C-293/09 My v ONP [2004] ECR I-12013; C-115/78 Knoors v Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs [1979] ECR 399, which was the first case to establish the Court’s conduct in such cases. 
44 Alina Tryfonidou, ‘In Search of the Aim of the EC Free Movement of Persons Provisions: 
Has the Court of Justice Missed the Point?’ (2009) 46 CMLR 1591; D Martin, ‘Comments on 
Ritter-Coulais (Case C-152/03) of 21 February 2006) and Ioannidis (Case C-258/04 of 15 
September 2005)’ (2006) 8 EJML 231.  
45 See C-112/91 Werner v Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt [1993] ECR I-429. This case concerned a 
German national who resided in the Netherlands and lived in Germany. The case arose owing 
to different tax regimes but the important element is that the Court acknowledged that this case 
would be treated as a purely internal situation had it not been for the movement of Mr Werner 
to the Netherlands. However, given that this case’s circumstances took place prior to the 
Maastricht Treaty, the Court said that the legislation in force at the time did not justify 
extending its personal scope to include Mr Werner’s claim. Interestingly enough, in the case of 
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Another case of reverse frontier worker was C-527/06 Renneberg,46 where a 
Dutch national who worked in his state of origin but lived in Belgium was 
denied the right to have his rent in Belgium considered for tax allowance 
purposes given the purely internal situation of the case, according to the Dutch 
arguments. According to the Court, however, the claimant fell under the scope 
of Article 39 EC (now Article 45 TFEU) owing to the outcome the opposite view 
would have on the freedom to move to one Member State while still having ties 
with another. It seems that whether the state where the economic activity is 
pursued is also the state of origin is immaterial for the purposes of defining the 
scope of EU legislation on free movement. 
 
A similar reasoning was followed in C-227/03 A.J. van Pommeren-Bourgondiën,47 
during the proceedings of which the Ritter-Coulais case was cited; in this case, a 
Dutch national who had spent her entire working life in the Netherlands but 
resided in Belgium was found eligible for insurance in the Netherlands despite 
her not residing there. The Court’s justification was that the opposite would 
constitute discrimination and would hinder free movement. It is interesting 
that the Court did not endeavour to explain how the case fit within Union law48 
but this could have been because it realised the importance of making the 
abolition of borders more substantive. Given that in certain areas the EU 
operates as a quasi-federation, allowing its citizens to work and reside in 
different Member States would be a natural implication. It is arguably true that 
the Court did not entirely change its stance: it still required certain conditions 
to be met, specifically that an intra-border move takes place and that an 
economic activity is pursued; the difference in the new approach was that these 
two actions no longer needed to be connected.49  
                                                                                                                                  
Ritter-Coulais, Mrs Ritter-Coulais was of dual nationality and the Court could have used this 
detail to support its argument and avoid the criticism, but did not make use of this opportunity. 
46 C-527/06 R.H.H. Renneberg v Staatssecretaris van Financiën [2008] ECR I-07735. 
47 C-227/03 A.J. van Pommeren-Bourgondiën Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank 
[2005] OC C 171. 
48 The Court did state that the Dutch legislation ‘undermines the principle of free movement 
secured by Article 39 EC’; the only problem with this statement was that this particular 
provision could not have been applied to the claimant as it did not exist when the facts of the 
case took place.  
49 See also C-544/07 Rüffler v. Dyrektor Izby Skarbowe [2009] ECR I‐3389 where a German 
national, recipient of two pensions, moved to Poland where he planned to reside without taking 
up employment. He paid income tax in Poland and applied for his insurance contributions to 
be factored in so he could pay less tax; these contributions, however, had been paid in 
Germany during his working life and Poland refused to take them into consideration. The 
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In C-212/05 Hartmann,50 a German national who worked in Germany but moved 
to Austria in order to be with his wife applied for child-rearing allowance 
which was denied because he was not a resident of Germany. The Court did 
not uphold this ban because Mr Hartmann was, for the purposes of this case, a 
frontier worker and thus eligible for such an allowance.51 A similar line of 
reasoning was followed in Hendrix,52 where a Dutch national was the recipient 
of a disability allowance, which was discontinued when he moved his residence 
to Belgium, although he retained his status as a worker in the Netherlands. The 
Court again did not accept the arguments of the Dutch authorities, according to 
which residence in the Netherlands was a prerequisite for the granting of the 
said allowance.  
 
The Court seems to be abandoning the wholly internal situation rule for the 
sake of a more comprehensive protection of free movement. It also seems that 
there are only two conditions that need to be met for the Court to initiate 
action and these are the pursuit of an economic activity and intra-border 
movement. Despite the somewhat dubious reversals of previous rulings, there 
are positive attributes that should not be undermined by negative comments on 
the potential inappropriateness of the Court’s judgment. Although the early 
case-law did offer a qualified right to free movement, the introduction of 
citizenship and the consequent evolution would not be compatible with the 
need to meet both requirements mentioned above in the same way the Court 
had suggested in the past. A new element is that these two conditions do not 
have to be linked and, thus, the economic activity in question may take place in 
one’s state of origin; the EU legislation will still be applicable irrespective of the 
fact that the move might take place for personal (relocation) rather than 
economic (a job abroad) reasons. This is a notable departure from the initial 
construes of the free movement rights, according to which a movement had an 
economic rationale first and foremost. Of course, over the years the Court and 
the Union have recognised that a right to residence would logically complement 
the right to free movement but this decoupling of the right to residence and an 
                                                                                                                                  
Court did not uphold its refusal since it constituted discrimination and also put those who 
exercised their free movement rights in a disadvantaged position. 
50 C-212/05 Gertraud Hartmann v Freistaat Bayern [2007] ECR I-06303. 
51 The Advocate General based her reasoning on Article 18 EC (NOW Article 21 TFEU) rather 
Article 39 EC (now Article 45 TFEU) and Directive 1612/68 as the Court did but it has been 
suggested this has been a legally incoherent application of the law as Article 18 was not 
applicable ratione temporis.  
52 C-287/05 Hendrix v Social Security for Migrant Workers [2007] ECR I-06909. 
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economic activity is an indication of a better form of citizenship.53 The Court 
has been particularly active in its endeavours to offer a new interpretation of 
free movement by arguing for an independent notion of citizenship, possibly in 
order to strike a balance between market freedoms and social Europe, a balance 
which can be elusive.  
 
Similarly, in Schwarz54 the Court addressed the issues created owing to a 
German provision according to which school fees could be taken into 
consideration for tax deduction purposes but only if the said schools were 
situated in Germany. The Court found this requirement unlawful as it 
constituted a potential barrier to free movement. The same reasoning was 
followed in Morgan,55 where according to a German law, in order to acquire a 
grant to pursue studies or training in another Member State, the said further 
studies had to be in continuation of a degree undertaken in Germany. In both 
cases, the nationals who were affected would be exercising their rights to free 
movement for educational purposes, namely a non-economic activity. 
Therefore, the Court once again stripped the free movement from the 
economic requirements and brought it in line with the citizenship provisions.56    
 
However, the Court’s approach has not been entirely unproblematic. Although 
the residence provisions (Article 25 TFEU) are mentioned in the case-law, they 
tend to be read in conjunction with Article 45 TFEU, which covers the 
economic freedoms. More worrisome is the fact that the claimants in some of 
the cases above never, strictly speaking, exercised the right to free movement of 
                                            
53 This departure, it has to be noted, is not the outcome of Ritter-Coulais. The AG in the seminal 
case of C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091 
had suggested that there is a right to residence even if the pursuit of an economic activity has 
moved to another state, although the residence provisions were combined with those of free 
movement for economic purposes. Nevertheless, it shows how gradual a process the evolution 
of citizenship rights has been. 
54 C-76/05 Herbert Schwarz and Marga Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach [2007] ECR 
I-06849. 
55 See joined cases Rhiannon Morgan v Bezirksregierung Köln (C-11/06) and Iris Bucher v Landrat 
des Kreises Düren (C-12/06) [2007] ECR I-09161. 
56 These two cases along with C-224/02 Pusa Osuuspankkien Keskinäinen Vakuutusyhtiö [2004] 
ECR I-05763; C-406/04 De Cuypter v Office national de l'emploi [2006] ECR I-06947; and C-192/05 
Tas-Hagen v Raadskamer [2006] ECR I-10451 are a testament to the Court’s efforts to ensure the 
independent enforceability of the Citizenship provisions by decoupling them from the non-
discrimination principle. In Tas-Hagen, for instance, the Court reversed previous rulings on 
war benefits and decided that they can be granted even when they fall outside the scope of 
Article 12 EC regarding discrimination (now Article 17 TFEU). Under the Lisbon Treaty these 
two principles are grouped but when these judgments were delivered the Court tried to 
interpret the law in such a way as to give citizenship more legal weight. 
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workers; they only moved to reside in another Member State, which is a 
citizenship right, valid since 1993. Although the former is understandable in 
the cases where Article 25 was not still in effect, the Court seems to prefer the 
safety of using the freedom of movement provisions in order to make its 
reasoning more substantial, or more ‘airtight’. This practice seems to 
undermine the increasing importance of citizenship and its undeniably positive 
effects on EU rights that were not explicitly covered by the Treaties57 and it 
calls for a different construction of the relevant rights. The latter situation is 
further testament to the relevance of such a readjustment. It is still true that the 
rights of a migrant worker can be suspended, albeit with considerable difficulty 
as there is little room for maneuver, unless there is an attested act that may 
affect public security, safety, or health; conversely, an individual who relies 
purely on their residence rights would have to face additional scrutiny as the 
Citizens’ Directive still speaks of the need to avoid becoming an unreasonable 
burden on a state’s social systems.58 It is my conviction that the practical 
implementation of the strictest elements of the provisions would be difficult 
and probably disproportionate. Therefore, although ‘mere’ residents seem to be 
under a thinner legal regime than their workers counterparts, the end result 
may be the same. Additionally, the cases above concern areas which are not 
harmonised and in which Member States still have almost absolute freedom: 
taxation and non-contributory social benefits.59 This is another argument in 
favour of further integration as such cases will continue to arise for as long as 
we have free movement rights in the EU, and the Court might again face a case 
which will result in the adoption of a legally questionable judgment in which 
the Court or its Advocates General consider the substance of the question and 
                                            
57 See job-seekers, students, pensioners, and persons of independent means. Their legal status 
is much better now but this is owing to the work of the Court and the introduction of 
Citizenship. 
58 This could also be a problem for an individual who relies upon their free movement rights 
but has found themselves without employment and thus fails to meet the requirements of 
Article 45 TFEU. However, it is arguable that this would pose fewer problems in practical terms 
than the wording of the provisions suggests, partly because said individual would have already 
worked in the country and would have been able to extend their residence if they could prove 
they had been looking for a new job or, they would have been in possession of the necessary 
means to survive on their own (an additional safety net is provided by the Court’s view that 
being asked to provide evidence for such claims would be a disproportionate requirement); and 
partly because there would have been the possibility to acquire the status of permanent 
resident of the host state after a 5-year uninterrupted residence. Moreover, one could also prove 
they have successfully integrated in the Member State in question, not to mention the practical 
difficulties in justifying expulsion. 
59 This is particularly relevant in the post-enlargement EU and especially as the transitional 
period has finally expiring (for the 2004 accession).  
     
 94 
the potential impact on free movement rather than the strict constitutional 
basis of the judicial review they will be performing.60  
 
Another criticism of the new approach of the Court suggests that it has been 
maximising the personal and material scopes of the free movement provisions 
to such an extent that one would wonder why EU citizens who do not exercise 
the right to move at all should not be included.61 Although this would resolve 
the issue of reverse discrimination, it does seem a step too far and an unfair and 
disproportionate criticism of the Court. What the Court has done is interpret 
the provisions in a teleological fashion and apply the law in order to give it the 
substance the legislator intended. It is not for the Court to act as a legislative 
body and it has refrained from doing so; rather, its endeavours reflect its role of 
interpreting and reviewing the implementation of EU law and it seems logical 
that it has been providing those who exercise their free movement rights with 
more comprehensive cover, regardless of the economic action pursued. The 
Union is indeed based on a common market but a political union is not beyond 
its scope.62 Quite the contrary, in fact, as ambitions for wider integration have 
been present ever since the very beginning of the Union and the Court is wisely 
factoring this in its decisions. However, as noted above, the Court should have 
used the residence and citizenship provisions as a legal basis (where that was 
possible) and not Article 39 EC (now Article 45 TFEU), as this practice denotes 
that the former provisions lack the legal weight of the latter. 
 
This section focused on a new tendency to revisit the established modus 
operandi which governs the purely internal situations and their relevance (or 
lack thereof) to EU law, which is used as a test by the Court to decide whether a 
case falls within its jurisdiction. This, however, is not the only new approach 
which questions the outer limits of Citizenship; two more recent cases, Ruiz-
Zambrano63 and McCarthy64 also gave rise to a debate about the future of 
                                            
60 AG Leger, for instance, acknowledged the Werner precedent while discussing Ritter-Coulais 
but also said that the case-law has been assessing the impact of cases that appear to have little, 
if any, actual connection to EU Law and may be discriminatory to workers (even if the 
claimants are not actually workers for the purposes of Article 45 TFEU). 
61 Tryfonidou (n 44).  
62 It is true that the wording of the free movement articles has not changed much since the 
1950s but this is only one side of the argument. Ever since the ECSC Treaty, other articles have 
been added, including those regarding residence and citizenship, while secondary legislation 
has covered groups such as students, who have been deemed beneficial for a better European 
integration irrespective of the fact that they perform no economic activity. Reading the articles 
without considering the temporal context and the efforts in other types of legislation in order to 
prove the Court’s imprudence tells only half the truth. 
63 C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi [2011] ECR I-00000. 
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Citizenship and the departure from rules, such as the purely internal situation 
and the need for an intra-border movement to take place in order to trigger the 
application of EU law. Ruiz-Zambrano referred especially to a new European 
space, while McCarthy is a more limited application of the principles 
established in the former case but, nevertheless, establishes a new trend which 
may be used in future Citizenship cases. 
3.2.2 A new, autonomous European space for Citizenship in the CJEU case-
law 
 
The judgment for the Ruiz Zambrano case was delivered only a few months ago 
in April 2011; the case concerned a Colombian national who left his home 
country and moved to Belgium where he applied for asylum. Although his 
application was rejected, he remained in Belgium in order to appeal against the 
initial decision, found employment and, in the meantime, his wife gave birth to 
two children. These children, by virtue of having been born in Belgium and in 
order to avoid rendering them stateless, were registered as Belgian nationals 
and, therefore, became EU citizens. When Mr Zambrano and his wife failed to 
win their appeal, they were unable to work and applied for unemployment 
benefits; their application was rejected and they initiated legal action and the 
case was subsequently referred to the CJEU. 
 
The case is reminiscent of Zhu and Chen,65 where a non-EU national was 
granted the right to remain in the Union because her daughter was born in 
Ireland and, although the UK had previously tried to deport her, this would 
have resulted in also deporting the baby who was an EU citizen. This finding 
was affirmed in Ruiz Zambrano and expanded as there was a material difference; 
in the Belgian case, there was no intra-border movement. The young children, 
upon whom the parents’s right to residence was based, had never left Belgium, 
but, nevertheless, the Court found that any measures which deprive EU citizens 
of their rights are against EU law (in this case, deporting the parents would 
constitute such a measure). Moreover, another qualification added by Zhu and 
Chen, that regarding the parents’s financial independence was removed. 
 
The important elements of the case are threefold: one concerns the right to 
residence conferred to parents via their children’s status of EU citizen; the 
other is the lack of intra-border movement, which seems not to be needed in 
order to trigger the application of the Citizenship rights; thirdly, the judgment 
                                                                                                                                  
64 C-434/09 Shirley McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECR I-00000. 
65 C-200/02 Zhu and Chen (n 27). 
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refers to a new European space and a new European territory, which is more 
than the sum of the territories of the Member States. The first element is 
important because it recognises an independent feature of Citizenship: one can 
invoke one’s rights simply by being an EU citizen, without the need to pursue 
an economic activity and without the need to have exercised their free 
movement rights, which is the second element of the judgment. In the past, the 
Court would look for an intra-border movement to establish a connection to 
EU law but, according to recent case-law, citizenship seems to be a bearer of 
rights in and of itself. This is indirectly relevant to the third point identified 
above, regarding the new European space. In the first years of Citizenship, one 
would talk about a type of European integration which would work at a 
transnational level, namely among the Member States and, especially to those 
involved in the intra-border movement, which would trigger the application of 
EU law. 
 
However, the Ruiz Zambrano judgment has given rise to a debate on the 
meaning of ‘European space’. According to the Court, this European territory 
is more than a geographical reference and it denotes an area of rights, a 
common identity, and European values. Therefore, the Court is approaching 
the founding ideals of personal fulfillment and the amelioration of one’s 
wellbeing by referring to rights which are applicable to individuals who are 
physically in the Union, without the need for an intra-border movement66 or 
the exercise of an economic activity (or even the need to be financially 
independent). In many ways, one can see in Ruiz Zambrano the principles first 
established in the earlier case of Rottman;67 Citizenship was referred to as 
providing independent rights to its beneficiaries and was regarded as a source 
of rights. Contrary to previous decisions, Citizenship should now be protected 
in order to protect the rights to which it gives access and the European identity 
which it helps to create. 
 
                                            
66 Interestingly, the preamble of Directive 2004/38 does mention that citizenship is to be the 
fundamental status of the EU citizens when they move to another Member State but the Court 
chose to use Article 20 of the Treaty as a legal basis for the judgment rather than the Directive. 
67 C-135/08 Rottman v Freistaat Bayern [2009] ECR 0000. The case concerned an Austrian 
national who moved to Germany after a case of fraud had been initiated against him in Austria 
and acquired the German nationality. He did not disclose his dealings with the Austrian 
authorities and when the German authorities discovered the case which was pending against 
him decided to remove his nationality. This would have rendered him stateless. The Court did 
agree with Germany’s decision but it demanded the proportionality principle be respected in 
order not to disadvantage him by rendering him stateless. In was, however, up to the Austrian 
Courts to decide whether his nationality could be reinstated.  
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However, the reasoning of the case was not repeated in an otherwise very 
similar instance, in McCarthy. Ms McCarthy was a resident of Northern Ireland 
who held dual British and Irish nationality. She had never left Ireland or taken 
up employment and was relying upon state benefits. Following her marriage to 
a Jamaican national who had no valid residence permit for the UK, she tried to 
use her own residence rights to make a case for her husband by acquiring an 
Irish passport. The Court found that she could not benefit from EU legislation 
because she had never exercised her free movement rights and the Court also 
referred to the Ruiz Zambrano case but failed to find any parallels between the 
cases as in Ms McCarthy’s case, her situation did not prevent her from enjoying 
her citizenship right fully. Moreover, the decision of the British court, which 
referred the case to the CJEU, did not mean that she would be expelled from 
the territory of the Union, as was the case with the Zambrano children. 
 
It appears from the case-law presented above that McCarthy and Ruiz-Zambrano 
are uncomfortable bedfellows and the latter has a limited exportability, which 
would only apply to the situation of a carer. However, this might be a 
premature statement given the tendency of the Court to approach every case in 
a different fashion, depending on the material details of each situation and the 
ad hoc assessment of each case’s circumstances. Therefore, it is not improbable 
that the Court will use the above reasoning again. What is of importance is to 
ensure that the Court has the necessary constitutional basis upon which to base 
its decision. The final section will focus on the suitability and potential of the 
Treaty of Lisbon to act as the said legal basis. 
4. The constitutional relevance of a new form of citizenship 
 
The previous sections have examined the political aspect of Citizenship and its 
ties with the pursuit of an economic activity and have identified a number of 
solutions that could make the concept more meaningful and relevant to 
Europeans of today, especially given the low degree of integration in specific 
areas or policy. However, there is another element that needs to be factored in 
any effort to move towards a new Citizenship: the constitutional basis upon 
which it will be built. The Treaty of Lisbon is still fairly recent but it can 
provide the said basis for any new endeavours to re-assess and revisit 
citizenship and also can provide for more social (and, eventually, political) 
rights which could form the building blocks for citizenship 2.0. 
4.1 First signs of change 
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The case-law of the Court comprises cases where Citizenship rights are deemed 
to be independent and cases where they are so in theory but not in essence. 
Despite this dichotomy, steps towards a more substantial concept can be 
identified and, in conjunction with the social aspect which is becoming more 
prominent, one can identify the premise of the efforts to offset the effects of 
liberalisation of services and employment in the EU. For instance, the Court 
was following the letter of the law when it delivered the judgments for Laval68 
and its progeny but it had its victims, in the form of the social character of the 
Union. Therefore, EU Citizenship has the potential to be used as a means to 
counterbalance this and the Treaty of Lisbon may provide the necessary 
constitutional ground for such an endeavour.  
 
In fact, a very good case in point is the evolution of the case-law from the four 
Posted Workers’ Directive (PWD) cases to the most recent one, Santos 
Palhota;69 Viking70 and Laval were two cases regarding industrial action and its 
lawfulness under EU Law. In the former case, a Finnish company running 
ferries between Finland and Estonia wanted to reflag one of its ships in order 
to lower running costs, prior to Estonia’s accession to the EU. The Finnish 
Seamen Union (FSU) threatened with industrial action while the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) participated in the negotiations regarding 
the ferry’s crew and demanded that the ferry be governed by Finnish law even 
after the re-flagging. This proved unsuccessful and negotiations were halted 
after an ITF circular to that effect. After Estonia joined the EU the negotiations 
resumed without success, and Viking referred the case to the English courts. In 
Laval, a Latvian firm won a commission for a construction project in Sweden 
and the Swedish unions wanted to ensure that the workers whom Laval would 
post to Sweden would be entitled to all their rights under Swedish law. Laval 
was not willing to agree to all suggestions made by the builders’ union and the 
latter blocked Laval’s construction site. Other unions joined in solidarity and in 
the end Laval’s Swedish branch declared bankruptcy.71    
                                            
68 C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet avd. 1 Byggettan and Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet 
Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 
69 C-515/08 Criminal Proceedings Against Santos Palhota and Others [2010] ECR I-00000. 
70 C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP, 
OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779. 
71 The PWD quartet also includes C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-01989 
and C-319/06 Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg [2008] ECR 
I-04323 but, for the purposes of this paper Viking and Laval are more relevant. The reader is 
reminded that Commission v Luxembourg concerned the transposition of the Directive in the 
Luxembourgish legal order; while Rüffert concerned minimum wages in a Land of Germany 
which differed from the minimum wages applicable elsewhere in Germany.  
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In both these cases, the thorny issue concerned the right to strike. Although 
the Court did recognise the right as being fundamental, it also pointed out that 
it can be a barrier to free movement and, thus, subject to judicial review and 
the proportionality test. Furthermore, and maybe more importantly, the Court 
also acknowledged the need to safeguard the right to strike in the battle against 
social dumping and the unpleasant effect of an open market based on 
competition; however, it stated that a minimum of standards could be provided 
for and this would be sufficient protection of fundamental working rights.72 
Neither of these cases has been welcomed but it could be argued that the Court 
was actually using its long-established teleology to interpret the then current 
legal status quo. 
 
Since then, however, the Treaty of Lisbon has come into force and another 
case, the aforementioned Santos Palhota case, was referred to the Court. The 
case concerned a Portuguese company posting workers to Belgium and the 
national regulations by which it had to abide. According to these rules, the 
Portuguese company had to produce specific documents for the social 
protection of the workers involved in the posting, whereas it also had to set up 
accounts for the payment of wages. It was the view of the company in question 
that the Belgian requirements were an obstacle to free movement of services. 
The Advocate General found that the case should be seen through a 
constitutional light and he based his opinion on the Treaty provisions rather 
than the PWD. As a consequence, he suggested that owing to the new 
constitutional reality, social values and the protection of workers cannot be 
deemed to be contrary to the market-based aims of the Union; rather, they have 
equal standing and the manner in which they are treated should reflect this. 
The Court agreed with the essence of AG’s points but did not pay the same 
attention to the constitutional debate he opened.  
 
Why the Court chose to do this is not exactly clear; maybe it felt it was not 
constitutionally endowed to act as the legislator as it is the responsibility of the 
                                            
72 The literature on the PWD case-law is vast and not all issues attached to the cases can be 
covered here. Indicative reading includes See ACL Davies, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’ (2008) 37 ILJ 126; C Joerges and F Rödl, 
‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law, and the ‘Social Deficit’ of European Integration: 
Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’ (2009) 15 ELJ 1; Barnard, 
‘Social dumping or dumping socialism?’ (2010) 67 CLJ 262; Barnard, ‘The UK and Posted 
Workers: The Effect of Commission v Luxembourg on the Territorial Application of British 
Labour Law’ (2009) 38 ILJ 122; P Davies, ‘The Posted Workers Directive and the EC Treaty’ 
(2002) 31 ILJ 298; Nicole Lindstrom, ‘Service Liberalisation in the Enlarged EU: A Race to the 
Bottom or the Emergence of Transnational Political Conflict?’ (2010) 48 JCMS 1307. 
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drafters of new treaties to set the aim of the primary law documents of the 
Union. In any case, Santos Palhota may become the basis for more judgments 
with a bias towards the social aspect of the EU; similarly, if the above reasoning 
is applied to the case of Citizenship, the Lisbon Treaty may be able to justify a 
new stance on Citizenship rights with a gradual move towards a more 
independent configuration. The next section will focus on changes in the 
Treaties which may help with such a departure.  
 
4.2 How could Lisbon bridge the gap 
 
Although no major amendments were made in the wording of the Citizenship 
provisions, the structure of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union led to grouping of the citizenship and non-discrimination provisions and 
extended their scopes to include the entire Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice,73 owing to the abolition of the pillar structure, first introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty.74 Similarly, the right to residence is part of the citizenship 
rights, which in turn means that economically inactive persons have a right to 
free movement granted by primary law and not by ad hoc secondary law 
provisions. Another problem which has been identified is the gap between 
social Europe and the market. One of the solutions suggested concerned a shift 
in priorities or, at the very least, better efforts to balance conflicting priorities 
such as fairer social rights and economic advancement. The Treaty of Lisbon 
seems to have addressed that by the insertion of a provision regarding services 
or general economic interest75 and the removal of the old reference to ‘free and 
undistorted competition’.76 Rather, the Lisbon Treaty now makes reference to a 
social market economy, which might sound like an oxymoron but demonstrates 
the Union’s wish to retain the social character for which European welfare 
states are known, but also to invest in open market policies in an increasingly 
competitive environment.77 If these changes seem to be less than substantive 
                                            
73 Equally, the jurisdiction of the Court now covers the entire Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. 
74 Editorial Comments (n 30). 
75 See Article 16 TFEU. It should be read along with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
These provisions aim at ensuring that all EU citizens live in a socially advanced Union where 
the negative effects of free competition are not left unaddressed.  
76 This reference was not entirely omitted; it can still be found in a Protocol on the internal 
market and competition. The Protocols attached to the Treaties carry the same legal 
significance but the omission from the text of the main Treaty might be more symbolic than it 
seems.  
77 Loïc Azoulai, ‘The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy: The Emergence of an 
Ideal and the Conditions for its Realisation’ (2008) 45 CMLR 1335. 
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and mere changes to the wording, one has to remember that the institution 
trusted with the interpretation of the Treaties, the Court has proven to be a 
liberal and radical interpreter of the Treaties. Therefore, these changes, minor 
as they may seem, will be more influential depending on the Court’s conduct. 
 
This is not to say that the Treaty of Lisbon introduced only welcome changes. 
Member States have the right to stop the drafting of a Directive destined to 
provide social security incentives for free movement if they find it to be against 
their social security systems. The process may, of course, be resumed but there 
is the option to do so even if as few as nine Member States reach an agreement, 
which is a double-edged sword: although such an arrangement will lead to the 
adoption of a potentially beneficial directive, it will create a fragmented à la 
carte European Union and will jeopardise all the efforts towards a more legally 
coherent Union. Additionally, and maybe more importantly, the balance 
mentioned above would appear to be a lost battle, mostly owing to the 
competences afforded to the European institutions. First of all, the efforts 
towards a social Europe will always have to be measured against the need to 
have an open market; this would not be a problem in and of itself were it not 
for the little independence the Union enjoys in the area of social policy. 
Industrial relation in the EU Member States are based on at least three 
different models which rarely converge and when they clash with the EU 
policies, the results are unwelcome to say the least.78 This seems like another 
reason for further harmonisation as, sooner or later, it will become more 
evident that the dichotomy between social and economic competences is no 
longer attainable.  
 
The former are covered by articles whose wording has hardly changed and 
which make reference to ‘harmonisation’ but also to its exclusion from certain 
policy areas. Unsurprisingly, Member States retain the right to adopt national 
laws which are stricter than their EU equivalent, provided the former comply 
with the Treaties.79 This requirement probably refers to the aims of the Treaties 
(and thus the Union’s) and the principles of non-discrimination and 
proportionality. Therefore, there is scope for judicial review as the Court might 
be asked to rule on the compatibility of national provisions with EU legislation, 
prompted either by the Commission or by a Citizen or other legal person; 
                                            
78 A relevant point concerns the legal significance given to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
under the Lisbon Treaty and the accession to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The former might not be as important an addition 
as it seems. The latter addition will mean that the European Court of Human Rights will have 
jurisdiction over the EU institutions and such a change should prove more substantive.  
79 Phil Syrpis, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Much Ado... But About What?’ (2008) 37 ILJ 219. 
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however, this does not change the fact that in order to rule on the said 
compatibility an action has to be initiated and, more importantly, 
harmonisation does not become easier as the fragmented state of the EU legal 
regime is protected.  
 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the changes in the Union’s aims and 
objectives reveal a certain bias in favour of social policies and even if this is not 
particularly outspoken or explicit, the Court will probably take this shift into 
consideration in its teleological reasoning. Despite reservation expressed over 
how possible this is80 the Court has a long story of loyalty to the letter of the law 
and such an example can be seen in the Santos Palhota case mentioned 
previously. This seed of a new stance towards fundamental freedoms read in 
conjunction with the Citizenship provision and the emphasis on social 
provisions afforded by the Lisbon Treaty may provide the latter with a solid 
constitutional basis and much-needed independence. However, the Court is 
not a panacea when it comes to finding the necessary ground for an elevated 
form of Citizenship and a proper constitutional revisiting of the provisions 
would be a longer-term solution.  
 
5. Conclusions 
  
This paper’s premise was the evolving nature of the citizenship provisions and 
their potentially independent construction. The distinction between a citizen as 
a political entity (citoyen) and a citizen/worker (travailleur) was a means to paint 
the picture of ever changing and growing material and personal scopes. The 
first section focused on the voting rights attached to Citizenship and criticised 
their limited scope. Despite the fact that the EU is not a state and, thus, cannot 
be expected to be organised as one, the rule of law and democracy are among 
its founding principles and this should be reflected in its political 
arrangements. 
 
The second section of the paper focused on the case-law of the CJEU in order 
to depict the changing attitudes towards what means to be a citizen of the EU. 
To do so, the first part presented a series of cases which seemed to signal a 
departure from the established rules on wholly internal situations, while the 
second part examined the most recent case-law which takes the aforementioned 
departure a step farther by revisiting the requirements which need to be met in 
order for the application of EU law to be triggered. This set of cases has been 
particularly important as it gave rise to a discussion about the new borders of 
                                            
80 Ibid. 
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Europe. It is arguable that we are moving towards a less geographical notion of 
Europe and towards a new construe whereby Europe is regarded as a common 
space of rights and common values, where EU citizens have rights by virtue of 
their physical presence in the Union rather than their exercise of free 
movement rights. 
 
The final part of this paper sought to explore the Lisbon Treaty’s potential to 
form the constitutional basis upon which this new configuration can be based. 
The first signs of the new approach were evident in the cases presented 
previously in this paper and, provided the Court follows similar reasoning, one 
could speak of a new dawn for citizenship, with a more independent character 
and less reliance upon market values and crossing of borders. Clearly, as 
McCarthy showed, this will not be always the case but, the Court’s modus 
operandi relies heavily upon ad hoc assessment of facts which means that each 
case will be judged differently, rather than on a ‘one size fits all’ basis. 
 
This is where the Lisbon Treaty comes in; given the changes it introduced, and 
the apt demonstration of said changes in the Santos Palhota reasoning (albeit 
reflected only in the AG’s opinion but not in the Court’s judgment), the Court 
could use this as a starting point for a more inclusive version of citizenship. It is 
indeed too early to talk about more political rights, a lack which the first part of 
the article noted, but the independence of the Union citizenship is ambitious 
could act as a catalyst for further change towards an independent source of 
rights and, maybe given time, a residence-based Citizenship with further 
political rights in a more democratic Union.  
